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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES

that an unexpected obstruction in the direct road would have made
even this detour necessary, or permissible.
A servant going upon a little longer, but permissible road, in
order to mingle some purpose of his own with the master's business,
doe not thereby depart from the service.5
The suggestion that the analogy of the liability imposed by
the workmen's compensation acts can be applied by the courts in
these cases without a statute does not seem to be one likely to be
FLOYD R. MECHEM.
adopted.
POST-TESTAMENTARY STATEMENTS TO PROVE A LOST WILL UNREVOKED.-[New York] An opinion' recently handed down by the

New York Court of Appeals presents an interesting problem in the
use of post-testamentary statements to prove that a lost will was
unrevoked at the testator's death. The will was executed in May,
1923, and was in the custody of the testatrix. Immediately after
her death, which occurred in November, 1923, diligent search failed
to discover the missing document. A proceeding was then brought
under the New York statute2 to probate the instrument as a lost will.
The execution and contents appear to have been satisfactorily
established. The contested questions were the continued existence
of the will or its fraudulent destruction by some third person. At
the trial proponents were permitted to prove two statements made
by the testatrix shortly before her death. One of these was a
conversation with her attorney who had drawn the will, to the effect
that she believed that her son-in-law knew the combination to the
safei in which the will had been kept, and that she had removed it
from this safe and placed it in a wall safe in her room. The other
statement was made to her brother that her will was in a safe place
where her son-in-law could not get at it.
The Court of Appeals; without discussion, held that such statements should have been excluded, merely observing: "That such
declarations were not admissible was decided by this court in matter
of Keniedy's Will, supra. (167 N. Y. 163). See also Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U. S. 552."
5. Compare Ritchie v. Waller (1893) 63 Conn. 155, 28 AtI. 29, 38 Am.
St. 361, 27 L. R. A. 161; Loomis v. Hollister (1903) 75 Conn. 718, 55 AtI. 561;
Weber v. Lockman (1902) 66 Neb. 469, 92 N. W. 591, 60 L. R. A. 313;
Hayes v. Wilkins (1907) 194 Mass. 223, 80 N. E. 449, 120 Am. St. Rep. 549,
9 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1033; Lovejoy v. Campbell (1902) 16 S.D. 231, 92 N. W.
24; Burton v. LaDuke 61 Utah 78, 210 Pac. 970; with McCarthy v. Timmins

(1901) 178 Mass. 378, 59 N. E. 1038, 86 Am. St. Rep. 490; Stone v. Hills

(1872) 45 Conn. 44, 29 Am. Rep. 635; Fleischner v. Durgin (1911) 207
Mass. 435, 93 N. E. 801, 33 L. R. A. (x. s.) 79; Healey v. Cockerill (1918)
133 Ark. 327, 202 S. W. 229, L. R. A. 1918-D, 115; Carrier v. Donovan
(1914) 88 Conn. 37, 89 Atl. 894; Colwell v. Bottle Co. (1912) 33 R. I. 531,
82 AtI. 388; Danforth v.Fisher (1908) 75 N. H. 111, 71 AtI. 535, 139 Am.
St. Rep. 670, 21 L. R. A. (N. s.) 93. See also Bloodgood v. Whitney (1923)

235 N. Y. 110, 139 N. E. 209; Edwards v. Earnest (1922) 208 Ala. 539, 94
So. 598.
1. In re Staiger's Will (1926) 243 N. Y. 468, 154 N. E. 312.
2. (1920) N. Y. Laws ch. 928 sec. 143.
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The Kennedy case 3 sustained the exclusion of similar evidence,
in part on the peculiar provisions of the New York statute on lost
wills, and in part on what the court accepted as the proper rule of
evidence.
"The petitioners were, therefore, obliged to prove, either that the
will and codicil presented for probate existed at the time of the testatrix's death or had been fraudulently destroyed in her lifetime.
The fact in issue was whether the instruments in question were physically in existence at the time of the death of the testatrix, and, if not,
whether they had been fraudulently destroyed during her life. If the
evidence offered did not prove, or tend to prove this issue, it was properly excluded. . . . The Supreme Court of the United States has
recently passed upon the questions involved in this case, in a decision to
which our attention was called. . . . As I read that case (Throckmorton v. Holt 180 U. S. 552), it is a decision of the highest court in the
land that the declarations of the deceased, when not a part of the res
gestae, are not admissible to prove the execution of the will or its revocation, or to rebut the presumption of revocation from the fact that no
will is found after death."
If the statute has so limited the probate of lost wills that
an unrevoked will, not fraudulently destroyed, could not be probated
unless actually in existence at the testator's death, it follows as a
matter of course that proof of the execution and contents and that
the will was never revoked would not per" se entitle the proponents
to probate. But since the court in both cases invoked the presumption of revocation, it would seem that any competent evidence
negativing revocation would be admissible, both to rebut that presumption, and to increase the probability of the will's continued
existence.
A will in existence shortly before testator's death must have
continued in existence unless in the interim it was destroyed by
accident, or by the intentional act of the testator, or by the fraudulent act of some third person. The elimination of one of these possibilities increases the probabilities of continued existence. Assuming, therefore, that evidence fairly tending to show that testator
did not intentionally destroy his will is relevant under the New
York statute, the competency of statements by the testator for this
purpose becomes important.
The general rule against hearsay normally excludes the mere assertion of a past fact or event to prove the truth of the matter or
fact thus asserted. There are, of course, a number of specific exceptions to this general rule of exclusion. For example, dying
declarations in criminal prosecutions for homicide, statements of
family relationship in pedigree cases, statements by persons since
deceased against pecuniary or proprietary interest, entries in the
regular course of business, etc., are well established. But until
quite lately there was no peculiar exception recognized in favor of
statements made by a testator not falling within one of these excepted groups. His statements that he had made a will, or had
3. In re Kennedy's Will (1901) 167 N. Y. 163.
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destroyed his will or had not destroyed his will, would undoubtedly
have been excluded by the general rule, if offered to prove the fact
so asserted.
The ruling in the St. Leonards case 4 in 1876, that statements
by a testator of the contents of his will were admissible to prove the
contents of a lost will, or at least to corroborate other evidence of
contents, was a departure from the previous English doctrine. In
fact the court went out of its way to overrule previous cases5 where
such evidence had been held inadmissible for that purpose. The
court was doubtless influenced by an instinctive feeling that the
testator's carefully thought-out plan for the distribution of his property ought not to be frustrated by accident or spoliation if there
was any possible way to discover the contents of this strangely
missing instrument.
While later English cases 6 throw more or less doubt on this
innovation, it has gained a considerable acceptance in the United
States, and there is an increasing number of late cases 7 sanctioning
the admission of testator's post-testamentary statements of the
contents of his will to prove the contents for various purposes.
Since no substantial distinction can be drawn between the
testator's statement of the contents of his will to prove its actual
contents, and statements of any other past fact or event in respect
to the will, statements by the testator that he had destroyed or revoked his will have been received to prove such facts.8
The soundness of this new exception to the hearsay rule may
well be doubted. It opens up a dangerous field for the manufacture
of evidence without much chance of detection. And even where
such statements have undoubtedly been made, their value is hard to
estimate because the testator may not remember accurately the contents of a will made long ago, or his own past conduct. From
the fact that he has been unable to find his will among his papers
he may erroneously conclude that he destroyed it at some prior
time when he contemplated a change in the disposition of his affairs.
Or the testator may have various reasons, difficult to bring to light
after his death, for misleading members of his family as to the
contents or destruction of his will.
Mere assertions of the existence of a will, or references to
it as in existence to prove the fact so asserted, seem hardly less
objectionable.
4. Sugden v. St. Leonards (1876) 1 Pro. & D. 154.
5. Doe v. Palmer (1851) 16 Q. B. 747; Quick v. Quick (1864) 3 Sw. &
Tr. 442.
6. Woodward v. Goilstone (1886) 11 A. C. 469.
7. McDonald v. McDonald (1895) 142 Ind. 155; Griflith v. Higginbotham
(1914) 262 Ill. 126; Mann v. Balfour (1905) 187 I<o. 290; Atherton v. GasHin (1922) 194 Ky. 460. In re Johnson's Est. (1920) 170 Wis. 436 (on issue
of forgery. State v. Scott (1926)" 242 Pac. (Calif.) 939 (on issue of forgery).
in

8. Leemon v. Leighton (1924) 314 Ill. 407, 145 N. E. 631, commented on
XIX 577.
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A theory has sometimes been advanced to obviate the difficulties
of the hearsay rule as applied to this class of statements, namely, that
they might be received, not as direct evidence of the fact asserted,
the existence of the will, but as circumstantial evidence of the
testator's belief in the existence of the will, which he could not
entertain if he had intentionally destroyed it.
The chief objection to this theory is that it involves refinements beyond the capacity of the average jury, and that its general
acceptance would wipe out most of the hearsay rule. Every assertion of a fact by a person in a position to know involves an implication of his belief in the truth of the statement, a belief which
he could not entertain if the fact were otherwise, provided of course
that his memory is not at fault. In general the process of reasoning from the belief of an unsworn uncross-examined declarant to
the truth of the thing believed, whether the belief is directly asserted or only implied, is, or has been, under the ban of the hearsay
rule. Thus, on an issue of testamentary capacity, business letters
from third persons, since deceased, to the testator, though implying
the belief of the writers in such capacity, were held inadmissible.9
The letters were good evidence of the belief of the writers, if any
legitimate use could have been made of such belief. But the belief
was not to be used to prove that it was well founded. And the older
cases certainly made no distinction between the belief of the declarant as, to his own past conduct, and his belief as to any other
past fact.
The use of belief as the basis for an inference as to probable
subsequent conduct involves an entirely different problem. Without
attempting to collect the array of cases on the point, it may be
conceded that the hearsay rule should exclude post-testamentary
statements that a will is in existence or is not in existence to prove
such facts either directly or by inference from the belief to the
truth of the thing believed.
But it does not necessarily follow that all post-testamentary
statements should be excluded on the issue of revocation vel non,
when not a part 'of the res gestae, 10 i. e., when not made con9. Wright v. Tatham (1837) 7 Ad. & E. 313.

10. As has been pointed out many times, this nebulous phrase has been
used in five or six different senses, to the great confusion of the law, viz.:
(a) Where the issue involves some physical act and a manifested intent, and
hence the words are provable because involved in the issue. (b) Where the
issue involves some physical act and an actual or subjective intention, and
the accompanying words assert or imply the intention. The words are here
admitted by way of exception to the hearsay rule because of the difficulty of
-proving intention in any other way. (e) Where intention is relevant to the
issue, and apparently natural and spontaneous statements of intention are
admitted to prove it, though not connected closely in point of time with any
physical act. (d) Where words are used purely circumstantially to show
some mental or emotional state. (e) Where the words are apparently the
natural and spontaneous reaction of the speaker to some external event,
before he has had time to reflect, as in People v. Del Vermo (1908) 192 N.
Y. 470. This attempted classification by no means exhausts the uses of this
phrase, but is sufficient to indicate caution when admitting or rejecting evi-
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temporaneously with some act in respect to the document. When
it is important to find out the actual intention with which an act
was done, statements at the Very time expressly or impliedly asserting the intention have always been received to prove such intention, because of the inadequacy of other means of proof. When
these conditions are fulfilled admissibility is settled by countless
precedents. But inadmissibility by no means follows because the
statements are not contemporaneous or closely connected in point
of time with some physical act. Courts have apparently thought
so at times, and have struggled hard to make a strict theory fit a
more liberal practice.
As a matter of fact, where intention is involved in the issue
no court has consistently restricted statements to prove intention to
such as accompanied, and were contemporaneous with the physical
act involved. While paying lip service to the time-worn phrase,
they made it indefinitely elastic. Thus, in an early bankruptcy
case, 11 where in ar action by the assignees against a third person
it became necessary for the plaintiffs, under the English practice,
to prove an act of bankruptcy, which was alleged to be a departure
from the realm with the intent to delay creditors, it was held proper
to admit statements made by the bankrupt several weeks -after his
departure from England, indicating that he feared to return and
put himself within reach of process. The court quite naturally and
legitimately argued from the bankrupt's subsequent fear of creditors
and his intention to remain out their reach that he had the intention
to escape from them when he left some weeks before. The admissibility of these subsequent statements troubled the court because
of the supposed limitation of the res gestae phrase, but the difficulty was solved by calling the act continuous.'2 Obviously the act,
dence because it is or is not a part of the res gestae according to some one
of its various meanings.
11. Rawson v. Haigh (1824) 2 Bing. 99.
12. At a much later period the Court of Appeals of New York indulged
in the same sort of reasoning to avoid the supposed limitation of the res gestae notion. The plaintiff sued as the assignee of an insurance policy on the
life of a man who had committed suicide. Under the laws of New York suicide was no defense. But the defendant set up that the policy was taken out
with the intention 'to commit suicide and thereby defraud the insurer. Evidence was admitted of statements made by the deceased prior to the issuance
of the policy indicating his purpose to obtain insurance for the benefit of various persons and then kill himself. These statements were not made contemporaneously with the act of obtaining the policy. The court disposed of the
difficulty which the res gestae phrase seemed to create, by treating the fraud
as the act, and thus brought the statements within the contemporaneous rule.
Smith v. National Benefit Society (1890) 123 N. Y. 85. It is clearly a case
of continuing intention instead of a continuing act.
Our law would be considerably clarified if lawyers and judges could be
realists instead of fictionalists. The result of the case is entirely sound, and
no continuous act was needed. Since a man's intentions can be known in
most cases only from his words and his acts, either or both are admissible to
prove intention at that time, provided the intention so proved will support an
inference as to his intention at some other time when legally important. The
res gestae phrase has no bearing on such problems and merely befogs the
questions. If the insured had such an intention shortly before he obtained
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departing the realm, was complete when the bankrupt reached
France, if not when he passed beyond the three-mile limit. His
fear of his creditors and his desire to avoid them was continuous,
or at least might be so found under all the circumstances.
Courts came in time to ignore the res gestae phrase, and admit without question statements of intention, not immediately connected with any act, whenever intention at the time asserted would
fairly serve as a reasonable basis for an inference as to intention
at some other period when intention was legally material. Thus
in actions for alienation of affection, the wife's letters to her husband and to third persons expressing her affection for her husband,
and written before her acquaintance with the defendant, have been
admitted to show the state of her affections at a later time when
defendant began to claim her attention and interest.' 3 So in change
of domicile cases where it was important to determine whether the
change took place at the time of the physical act of leaving, prior
statements of intention have been admitted, though certainly not a
part of the res gestae.14 Such illustrations might be multiplied to
great length from nearly every state in the Union.
It has been urged that the exception to the hearsay rule admitting statements expressly or impliedly asserting intention, or
some other mental state should be limited to cases where such mental
state is involved in the issue. That the frequent inadequacy of
circumstantial evidence to prove purely subjective facts makes a
resort to hearsay necessary when the nature of the issue requires
the ascertainment of intention. But that no such inherent necessity
exists where a purely evidential use is sought to be made of a
mental state. For example,
5 when it is sought to infer probable
conduct from prior intent.
Precedent furnishes little support for this view, for in general
the same sort of evidence is admitted to prove a given fact, whether
ultimate or evidential.
A, few courts have had the peculiar notion that statements indicating some mental state are not hearsay if they accompany and
explain some physical act, and are therefore inadmissible when not
so made. This fog appears to have enveloped the Supreme Court
of the United States in the Throckmorton case;' 6 and produced
sweeping condemnation of any evidential use of a testator's statements in a will case when not connected with physical acts.
the insurance, there was a strong probability that he had the same fraudulent purpose when he applied for the policy. But his statements were not
contemporaneous with anything except the mental state which they asserted
or implied.
13. Trelawy v. Colemna,; (1817) 1 B. & Aid. 90; Willis v. Barnard
(1832) 8 Bing. 376.
14. Viles v. Waltham (1893) 157 Mass. 542. In re Newcomb Est.
(1908) 192 N. Y. 238 (admitting statements, after removal, of intention to
make the new place a permanent home).
15. Seligan
"An Exception to the Hearsay Rule" Harv. Law Rev.
26:146.
16. Throckinorton v. Holt (1900) 180 U. S. 552.
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"When they are not a part of the res gestae, declarations of this
nature are excluded because they are unsworn, being hearsay only, and
where they are claimed to be admissible on the ground that they are
said to indicate the condition of the mind of the deceased with regard
to his affections, they are still unsworn declarations, and they cannot
be admitted if other unsworn declarations are excluded."
This is a strange conclusion from the court that decided Mutu al
Life Ins. Co. v. Hilron, 145 U. S. 285, a few years earlier.
Obviously, a man's statements indicating his intentions or any
other mental state are hearsay, and equally so, whether made in
connection with an act or not. Such a sweeping generalization was
not called for by thd facts of the Throckmorton case. The main
issue was the forgery of a will, and secondarily its revocation.
After the death of Judge Holt, an instrument purporting to be his
will, dated many years before, was received in the mail by the
registrar of wills. Contestants claimed that it was a forgery, and if
genuine, that it had been revoked. At the trial two classes of
statements by the testator were admitted: (a) Letters indicating
a friendly interest in various relatives who were not provided for
in the will, and some dislike for the father of one of the principal
legatees; (b) Statements made during the latter part of his life
as to the provisions of his will, which were quite different from
those contained in the contested instrument.
The letters were received without objection, but might well
have been rejected as too colorless to warrant any inference on
either issue. Friendly interest in collateral relatives did not make it
improbable that he would have omitted them. Dislike for the father
of Miss Throckmorton did not make it improbable that he would
provide for her, since there was nothing to indicate that his dislike
for the father extended to the daughter with whom he appeared
to be on good terms. In other words, the mental state disclosed
by the letters was too remotely relevant to be worth considering.
The statements as to the contents of his will were inadmissible
as mere narratives under all the precedents prior to the St. Leonards
case, and even under the extension of that doctrine insufficient per
se to prove the execution and contents of an undiscovered revoking
will. 7 The fact that the testator had, at some time or other, made
a will differing from the will in contest would not have been
sufficient to throw doubt on the genuineness of that instrument. It
did not make it improbable thaf many years before he would have
had the testamentary intentions embodied in the contested instrument. On the main issue of forgery these statements were clearly
inadmissible. On the secondary and practically ignored issue of
revocation, these statements could not be received to prove directly
that he had made a later will which impliedly revoked the contested will. And if it were conceded that toward the end of his life
testator intended that certain relatives should share in his property,
that would not warrant an inference that such intention had been,
or was thereafter, carried out by the execution of a revoking will,
17. Clark v. Turner (1897) 50 Neb. 290.

21 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

in the absence of any other proof of the execution, attestation and
contents of the supposed instrument.
His statements as' to the provisions of some will, even if received to prove his intentions at that time in respect to the disposition
of his property, could serve no useful purpose and were likely to
mislead the jury. With so many easilr understood objections to
the evidence it is unfortunate that the court should have added
confusion to a subject sadly in need of clear thinking.
At this late day it is surprising to find a lingering doubt of
the admissibility of statements of intention as the basis of an inference as to probable conduct. Courts have always sanctioned inferences as to conduct based on motive, intention, belief, etc. For
example, threats by a defendant to commit the crime with which
he was charged have always been received as evidence tending to
show his guilt, i. e., that there was a fair probability that he acted in
accordance with his desires and intentions. No hearsay problem
arises in such cases because the defendant's own statements are
receivable as admissions. 8
The validity of the argument from intention to conduct was so
thoroughly recognized that it was inevitable that the difficulty of
proving the basis of the inference should lead to the use of the
sfatements of a third person to prove his intention in order to discover his probable conduct. Accordingly, at a fairly early period
we find the courts admitting statements of third persons expressly
or impliedly indicating their intention to do various acts, as a basis
for inferring that they probably acted accordingly. Examples are
found in bankruptcy cases, 19 admitting prior statements by the bankrupt of his intention to create fictitious indebtedness, to prove that
an acceptance was without consideration.
In will cases prior statements of the testator as to his intended
disposition of his property have been admitted to prove that an
interlineation in' the will was made at the time of its execution ;20
also statements by the testator of his satisfaction with 2his will, to
rebut the presumption of destruction animo revocandi. 1
On the issue of self-defence uncommunicated threats by the deceased have been admitted to prove that he was probably the ag18. Admissions seem to be true exceptions to the hearsay rule. Morgan "Admissions as Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule" Yale Law Jour. 30:355,
but their general admissibility is so universally recognized that no question of
the hearsay rule is ever raised.
19. Thompson v. Bridges (1818) 8 Taunt. 336.
20. Doe v. Palner (1851) 16 Q. B. 747.
21. Whitely v. King (1864) 17 C. B. (N. s.) 756. This has been followed in similar modem cases, in re Page (1886) 118 Ill. 576; Holler v. Holler (1921) 298 Ill. 418 (expressions of dissatisfaction with the will to prove
probable revocation) ; Mckfurtry v. Koepke (Mo. 1923) 250 S. W. 399 (statements of satisfaction with the will to rebut presumption of revocation;
State v. Ready (1910) 78 N. J. L. 599 (prior statements of testamentary
intentions to prove probably genuineness of a will alleged to have been
forged).
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gressor.2 2 The unqualified adoption by the Supreme Court of the
United. States in the Hiifmon case 3 of the rule that statements of
intention are admissible to prove conduct gave to it a standing which
is now practically unquestioned. For a time there was doubt and
controversy over the admissibility of threats of suicide, but the
courts could hardly admit threats of -the deceased to kill the defendant and exclude threats of the deceased to kill himself, and
at last the admissibility of threats of suicide seems settled, except in
Illinois where
the res gestae notion has produced confusing incon24
sistencies.
Now in the principal case sound precedents would not admit the
statements of the testatrix as to the removal of the will from one
safe to another, and that it was in a safe place, etc., as narratives
of her past conduct, or as implying the existence of the will at the
time referred to. But if threats of a deceased person to commit
suicide.or to assault the defendant are admissible to prove that he
probably carried out the intention thus expressed, and in numerous
other instances statements showing an intention to do a given act
are admissible to prove the probability of corresponding conduct,
it would seem that in the principal case the statements of the testatrix should have been admissible to prove that shortly before her
death she was satisfied with her will and anxious to preserve it from
prying curiosity or fraudulent destruction. These statements fairly
implied such a state of mind, and were made under conditions which
negatived any motive to deceive.
If such statements fairly indicated her real mental attitude toward her will, it is extremely unlikely that she intentionally destroyed
it either before or after the conversations in question. Even in
Illinois, where the courts are more strongly influenced by the res
gestae phrase than those of New York, statements of a testator expressing dissatisfaction with his will have been held admissible to
prove that he probably destroyed the missing instrument.25 It may
be that the exclusion of the statements in question did no particular
harm because of the lack of sufficient evidence of the will's continued existence as required by the statute. But the approval of
the res gestae limitations announced in the Kennedy and Thrack22. Campbell v. People (1854) 16 Il1. 17; State v. Sloan; (1871) 47 Mo.
604; State v. Elkins 1876) 63 Mo. 159; Stokes v. People (1873) 53 N. Y. 164.
23. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmoi, (1891) 145 U. S. 285. See Maguire

"The Hillmon Case" Harv. Law Rev. 38:709.

24. Comnonwealt* v. Trefethe)m (1892) 157 Mass. 180; State v. Ilginfrita (1915) 263 Mo. 615; People v. Conklin (1903) 175 N. Y. 333, 343; ComGreenacre v. Filby
monwealth v. Santas (1923) 275 Pa. 515. Contra:
(1916) 276 Ill. 294, because the threats of suicide were not made at the time
of any act. The same court had reversed the case of Nordgren v. People
(1904) 211 I1. 425, because of the exclusion .of threats of suicide. But in
that case there was an act. The deceased kept poison in her room, and the
threats were contemporaneous with this act of keeping poison. But according to the reasoning of the Greenacre case the threats would have been inadmissible if made a few hours before deceased obtained the poison.
25. Holler v. Holler (1921) 298 I1. 418.
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morton cases is likely to create difficulties in a case where nonrevocation may be a vital issue.
E. W. HINTON.
STREETS AND HIGIHWAYs-PREscRIPTIoN-BURDEN OF PROOF
OF ADVERSE CLAIM.- [Illinois] Two recent cases in the same vol-

ume seem to disclose two apparently diverging views upon the
question of who has the burden in cases of public ways by prescription, in the matter of the element of adverse, claim, which of
course is one of the essentials to make out a prescriptive right.
The earlier of two cases' indicates that use alone for the
statutory period establishes the right prima facie, and raises a presumption that the use was adverse, the burden to rebut such presumption being on the person who contests the prescriptive right.
The later of the two cases, 2 on the other hand, seems to indicate
that there is no such presumption from mere user, and that this
element of adverse claim must be proved, as well as user, by the
one claiming the prescriptive right, though express notice of such
claim need not be shown, it being sufficient if the circumstances
establish the existence of such a claim.
This divergence seems to originate with two cases, the one
holding that user alone, no matter how long continued,
does not4
3
satisfy the proof necessary to establish the right and the other
holding, apparently, that use alone raises the presumption.5
As reflected by the two cases last mentioned, the apparentdivergence, it seems, becomes largely one of phraseology, however,
because both cases on their faces proceed as it were from the same
1. Mudge v. Wagoner (1926) 320 Ill. 357, 362.
2. Gietl v. Smith (1926) 320 Ii. 467: "The use of vacant and unoccupied land by the publid is presumed to be permissive and not adverse. To
establish a highway or public way by prescription it is necessary that the
use shall be under a claim of right, adverse, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted fo' the statutory period. Doss v. Bunyan supra;
O'Connell v. Chicago Terminal Transfer Railroad Co. 184 Ill. 308, and cases
there cited. There must be something more than mere travel by the public
over unenclosed lands to create a highway by prescription. Use by a few
individuals, and not by the public generally, does not constitute such use by
the public as creates title by prescription. The user must be under claim of
right in the public and not by mere acquiescence on the part of the owner.
Express notice of such claim is not necessary, but there must be such conduct on the part of the public authorities as to reasonably inform the owner
that the highway is used under a claim of right. Town of Brushy Mound .
McClintock 150 Ill. 129. The record contains no proof of any act on the
part of the municipality or its officials in either accepting, improving or maintaining the alley in question. It does show that when First Street was
paved the curb was built straight along the street and no provision was made
to permit access to or from the alleged alley. This act indicates the municipal authorities had no intention of assuming control of the strip and their
belief that it was not an alley. Palmer v. City of Chicago 248 Ill. 201. The
proof contained in this record is insufficient to establish a public alley by
prescription."
3. Doss v. Bunyan 262 Ill. 101.
4. Thorworth v. Sheets 269 Ill. 573.
5. 269 Ill. 582.

